This report's gauges — live widgets update with new observations after publication · Trigger 2 Watch 5 Wait 1 · Each needle has its own data date Removed from this edition: #18's four currencies (won, yen, Taiwan dollar, yuan). They are not retired globally; this report focuses on barrels, and they may return. No composite score: read the eight needles separately.
On Thursday, September 10, Yemen's Houthi rebels took Perim Island in Bab el-Mandeb, at the Red Sea's entrance. The same day, drones from Iraq hit pumping stations on Saudi Arabia's East–West Pipeline. The next day, Saudi Arabia shut the 1,200km pipeline. Hormuz had already been closed for 197 days. The Arabian Peninsula's two sea gates closed together within 48 hours.
Brent was USD 108 on Monday (9/14). US retail diesel reached a record USD 6.05/gallon on 9/11. Yet that week, US Treasuries raised 10-year implied inflation only 1bp; gold fell for a 3rd week; the dollar rose for four straight days; and the Fed was preparing a hike two days later.
In 1973, such a week would have belonged to inflation. In 2026, it belonged to the price of time. This report follows the source of that difference and how the price of a barrel reached the world. Its final destination is Yeouido.
Brent (9/14)
$108.09
One month +19% · 1 year +60%
IEA quoted 9/9: $113.48 — both figures are shown
US retail diesel (9/11)
$6.05/gallon
Record high
1 year earlier: $3.70
10-year real yield (9/11)
2.60%
+17bp (9/4→9/11)
Nominal 10-year +18bp — the entire rise was real
10-year implied inflation (9/11)
+1bp
30-year unchanged at 2.28%
The barrel did not become inflation
01
48 hours in which two gates closed
Bab el-Mandeb, East–West Pipeline and Hormuz — September 10–11, two gates and one pipeline
1
Bab el-Mandeb.
Mocha port on September 10; Perim (Mayun) Island on the 11th. Yemeni government forces withdrew, and the Houthis took six districts totaling 5,400km² in 18 hours, according to their military spokesperson. The political bureau first declared navigation safe and orderly, then added: " Saudi vessels are excluded. They are already banned." (translated) The Saudi-vessel ban announced in late July could now be enforced from both shores of the 30km strait. The US reportedly declined Saudi Arabia's request for airstrikes★. The EU's Aspides operation lacks a ground-operations mandate. This strait carries 12% of global trade, 11% of seaborne oil and 8% of LNG (IMF PortWatch).
2
East–West Pipeline.
On September 10, drones hit pumping stations in the Riyadh and Medina regions; on the 11th, Saudi Arabia's energy ministry halted operation as a precaution. Capacity is 7 million barrels/day, expanded from 5 million before the war; actual flows were 4–5 million. Iraq's prime minister's office identified Maysan province as the launch site, dismissed the regional commander and closed the Iranian border. Saudi Arabia's foreign ministry said: " The Kingdom has decided not to respond at this stage." (translated) No restoration deadline was announced★. Repair after April's attack on the same pipeline took three days to a week. An Aramco force-majeure declaration has not been confirmed★.
3
Hormuz.
Closure declared February 28; 197 days as of September 13. Passage is 6–10 vessels/day, versus 85 before the war, all with AIS on and most escorted. War insurance costs 7.5–12.5% of hull value per voyage, 30–50x prewar levels. Iranian crude exports are 0 (US naval blockade resumed July 14).
The sequence matters. Saudi crude output in August was 6.238 million barrels/day — −23% from the prior month, lowest since 1990. Exports were about 3.1 million barrels, versus 5.1 million in July. These figures came before the pipeline strike. The Houthis' late-July ban on Saudi vessels first broke the bridge from Yanbu into the Red Sea. The pipeline then cut off feedstock headed toward an already blocked gate.
Two gates — the southern gate and its detour
Tankers/day, 7-day moving averages · Window: 2026-07-20–2026-09-06 · Lines: daily PortWatch AIS, our collection through 2026-09-06; publication lags by days. Dashed circles at right: TankerMap 7-day averages (2026-09-15, secondary source). Different windows and compilers mean we do not join them on one line. Outside Hormuz observations are 6–10 vessels (straits.live, gCaptain, Windward), above our AIS count; both are stated. No volumes (mb/d), only vessel counts. · ★The 2 event lines fall outside the AIS publication window and are omitted (09/10 Perim capture, after the data end; 09/11 East–West halt, after the data end). Drawing lines on unavailable dates would be less accurate · ★The body's 3.3 vessels (§06/gauge table) is the 9/14 TankerMap 7-day average(secondary), differing from this chart's PortWatch 7.0 (2026-09-06) and TankerMap 3.9 (2026-09-15) in both window and compiler. They are three different measures, not three conflicting values
The southern gate has fluctuated at low levels since the late-July ban. Suez remains high as containers return. The gap is this report's opening statement: tankers and containers move oppositely on the same sea.
02
A barrel has more than one price
Three products from the same crude receive three prices — dates differ by row
Measure
Valuation
As of
Brent
$108.09(9/14, +3.3%; one month +19%, 1 year +60%) · IEA quoted 9/9: $113.48 — both figures shown
9/14 · 9/9
WTI
$103.22
9/14
US retail diesel
$6.05/gallon, record high(1 year earlier: $3.70)
9/11
Diesel crack / gasoline crack
$106 / $41
9/9
Naphtha (MOPJ)
$855/tonne ≈ $96/barrel — cheaper than Brent
9/11
Asian LNG (JKM) / European gas (TTF)
$24.89 (1 year +119%) / €83.66/MWh, highest since December 2022
9/11 · 9/14
Qatari LNG shipments
18 cargoes in 6 months of war (509 a year earlier) = −96% · Force majeure through early November
9/8
VLCC (Middle East→China)
About USD 800 thousand/day(45 thousand normally); Lloyd's List calls it a hypothetical rate, with almost no actual charters behind the nominal calculation
September
US commercial crude stocks / Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR)
424.1 million / 285.4 million barrels — lowest since 1982, falling 1.2 million/week
9/4
A barrel has more than one price. Three products from the same crude receive three prices. Diesel earns USD 106 more than crude; gasoline USD 41 more; naphtha less. Trucks and power plants keep running, cars travel less, petrochemicals have already cut back. Prices reveal that sequence.
Three barrels — diesel and gasoline gain, naphtha loses
Cracks, $/bbl · Diesel, gasoline and 3-2-1 calculated directly from EIA daily spot data (NY Harbor products ×42−WTI, matching bases). Naphtha alone is one dot: MOPJ 96.1 (2026-09-11, secondary) − Brent 108.99 [ICE front-month Brent via Yahoo; fv_struct.market_prices.brent_prompt_futures; as_of 2026-09-14] = −12.89. Mixed bases mean it is not joined into a line · ★A different figure was used from the body's $108.09 (9/14 market) for this comparison — same Brent, different time
Diesel gains, naphtha loses. Two products from one barrel carry opposite signs. This is the basis for §07's two statements: refining is profitable while petrochemicals are under pressure.
03
The puzzle — the barrel did not become inflation
9/4→9/11 US Treasuries — nominal yields rose, entirely through real yields
Last week (9/4→9/11), US Treasury yields rose +16bp for 3-month bills, +26bp for 2-year bonds, +18bp for 10-year and +11bp for 30-year. The front end rose more. The 10-year inflation-protected (TIPS) real yield moved from 2.43% to 2.60%, up +17bp. Yet the nominal–real gap, market-implied inflation (BEI), for the 10-year was +1bp; the 30-year was unchanged at 2.28%. That 30-year 2.28% is below the Fed's 2% target plus the price-index difference of about 0.3 percentage points.
In one sentence: the entire 10-year yield rise was real. Markets did not read 3.4% consumer inflation, USD 108 oil and 197 days of blockade as entrenched inflation. They read them as requiring higher real yields.
Other figures that week point the same way. Gold fell from USD 4,366 (9/11) to USD 4,330 (9/14), its 3rd straight weekly decline, −17% from February's peak. The dollar index rose for four days to 99.6. The probability of a Fed hike on September 16 was 79% on Polymarket, 86% in markets and 90% at CME (9/12), versus 33% before late-August Jackson Hole.
In 1974, the opposite happened: the oil shock fed inflation expectations. Fed Chair Burns called inflation nonmonetary, but markets did not believe him. In 2026, markets believed Chair Warsh before the meeting. Households did not: the University of Michigan's preliminary September survey put 1-year inflation expectations at 4.6% (August 4.0), 5–10-year expectations at 3.4%, and sentiment at 47.8. Markets believe the Fed; households do not. This gap returns in §09.
Inflation's components suggest why. Within August's 3.4% CPI, energy rose +16.3% and gasoline +27.4%, more than 1/3 of the monthly increase. Core inflation excluding energy was 2.4%. Unit labor costs rose +1.4%; labor's income share was 52.8%, lowest since records began in 1947. Wages are not chasing prices. We also record counterevidence: core producer inflation 4.7%, core personal-consumption-expenditure inflation 3.3%, and Warsh's figure—49% of PCE categories rising more than 3% annually, versus 32% before the war.
The puzzle — higher oil moved real yields, not inflation expectations
2026-09-04→2026-09-11 changes, bp · US Treasury daily nominal/real curves (primary source) · BEI=nominal−real, calculated for matching dates. Alongside: gold 4,431 (08/31)→4,366 (09/11). The body's 9/14 close of 4,330 lies outside our series and is omitted here
In the week oil rose, real yields moved rather than inflation expectations. BEI added 1bp. In 1973, the bars would have looked reversed. This chart is the report's puzzle.
04
Three answers
Demand breaks first · The US is a seller · Data centers set the price of time
One
Demand breaks first.
International Energy Agency (IEA), September 11 report: global oil demand in 2026 −2.5 million barrels/day, another 940 thousand below the month-earlier forecast: the first annual decline since 2020. Global inventories fell 507 million barrels since February, including 95 million in August. Gulf production shut-ins exceed 10 million barrels; OPEC+'s remaining spare capacity is 220 thousand barrels, effectively 0. Yet the US Energy Information Administration (EIA, 9/9) forecasts second-half Brent at USD 90 and next year's second half at USD 67. Goldman Sachs sees Q4 at USD 71★. The futures curve places 2032 WTI near USD 60.
China is the largest piece. Q2 crude imports fell −30%; June was the lowest since 2016 and refining the lowest since early 2020. Gasoline consumption fell −5%, diesel −13%. And China drew down reserves: net draws of 360 thousand barrels/day, versus stockbuilding of 1.57 million in last year's Q2. This reversal alone explains 54% of the import decline (Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy). Naphtha below Brent means Asian petrochemicals have already cut back. Markets see the barrel shock as temporary because demand is breaking first, not out of optimism.
Two
The US is now a seller.
US refinery utilization was 97.8%(94.9% 1 year earlier). Product exports were 8.45 million barrels/day, up 1.04 million on the week; crude exports fell −1.07 million. US refiners make the world's diesel. That explains the USD 106 diesel crack and Trump's September 13 demand that Zelensky stop attacking Russian diesel facilities; Zelensky refused. As #18 explained, the US is a net crude exporter, so oil and the dollar move together. The US bought in 1973 and sells in 2026. The same shock weakened the dollar then and strengthens it now.
Three
Data centers, rather than barrels, set the price of time.
Bond markets seek the reason for rising real yields in investment rather than crude. US information-processing-equipment investment runs at USD 795 billion annually (+31%), software at USD 817 billion. Together they equal 4.96% of GDP, above the 2000 dot-com peak of 4.46%(Q2). In one quarter, NVIDIA increased supply commitments from USD 119 billion to USD 279 billion, mainly memory (10-Q, 8/26). ECB President Lagarde, 9/10: AI-related bond financing is a key driver of rising global rates (translated). Chair Warsh, 8/28 Jackson Hole: financial conditions are accommodative; AI token revenue exceeds USD 100 billion annually, up +500% year on year.
Data centers set the price of time. Thus oil can rise alongside real yields, and higher real yields push gold down. Those three movements together describe last week.
05
The world — seven destinations for the price of a barrel
Europe, Japan, China, the Gulf, emerging economies, inside the US, Russia — one barrel, seven shapes
1
Europe pays twice.
Europe is not merely receiving less crude through Hormuz; it is not receiving gas. Qatar shipped 18 LNG cargoes in 6 months; force majeure lasts through early November. TTF gas is €83.66/MWh, highest since December 2022 (1 year +160%); storage is 66.4%, 16pp below last year. Goldman sees winter prices of €100 without normalization★. Europe is returning to coal: the IEA forecasts record global coal use of 8.94 billion tonnes in 2026. The second price is interest rates.
The ECB unanimously raised its deposit rate to 2.50% on September 10; Lagarde called it a no-brainer (translated). Markets see three further hikes by next April. UK 10-year gilts yield 5.36%; 30-year yields approach 6%, a level dating to 1998. Four Bank of England hikes are priced. The France–Germany spread is 90bp, a 1-year high. Europe pays for energy and time; the US pays for the latter. Alongside: the EU deferred its Russian-oil-price-cap adjustment mechanism because of Hormuz until July 2027 (21st sanctions round, 7/23). The barrel even changed sanctions design.
2
Japan receives the shock through the yen and bonds.
Japan's CPI is 1.9%, below its 2% target for six months. Yet producer inflation is 7.6% and import inflation +30% (June), jointly shaped by oil and the yen. The Bank of Japan is widely expected to hike to 1.25% on September 18, highest since April 1995. Governor Ueda: a hike is on the table at every meeting (translated). The 30-year government yield is 4.02%, near a record; the finance ministry cut superlong issuance to a 17-year low.
The government cushions the shock with July–September power/gas subsidies and gasoline capped at JPY 170. On July 31, it bought yen alongside the US Treasury. Japanese investors also sold foreign securities for 3 straight weeks (JPY 4.1 trillion, 8/16–9/5). That cannot be attributed to oil alone, but oil-linked bond yields (30-year 4%) may provide a reason to come home (our interpretation).
3
China uses less and sells cheaply.
It is the largest part of the −2.5 million global-demand decline and is drawing reserves. Meanwhile CPI is 0.8%, PPI 3.8%, with energy ending deflation; lending rates have been unchanged for 15 months; and the yuan is strongest since January 2023 (6.71). Less Chinese consumption and cheaper exports press down allies' inflation. The route As #18 examined earlier also operates through barrels. Alongside: China directs its surplus toward gold—central-bank buying for 21 straight months, +20 tonnes in July—and mines, rather than US Treasuries.
4
In the Gulf, producers are the victims.
Oil is expensive, but sellers cannot sell. Saudi August output was lowest since 1990, exports 3.1 million; Iranian exports 0. Qatari LNG fell −96%, with roughly USD 24 billion lost in 6 months. Only Iraq is recovering: Basra shipped 2.35 million barrels/day in August (July 1.35 million; prewar 3.3 million). From September, state-owned SOMO delivers outside Hormuz. Kuwait and Qatar restored 70% of crude through ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Oman.
The UAE has half-built its 2nd Fujairah bypass pipeline, targeted for 2027. This links back to earlier reports: Gulf investment promises to the US—UAE USD 1.4 trillion, Saudi Arabia about USD 1 trillion, Qatar USD 1.2 trillion—are financed by oil revenue. Another reason named, identifiable execution is only 1.5–3%: there are no barrels to sell. Saudi Arabia's decision not to respond to the pipeline attack signals a producer choosing recovery over escalation.
5
Emerging economies do not move in one direction.
India: foreign net selling of equities reached INR 13,138 crore in September and, year to date, INR 2.37 trillion, already above full-year 2025's INR 1.66 trillion. Indian analyst Vedant Gupte: September selling is a dollar-and-oil story, not an India story (translated). The Reserve Bank of India held rates, calling inflation supply-driven. Brazil, by contrast, will bring its policy rate to 13.75% on September 16 through a cut (95% priced). Producers and high-rate countries cut; importers and low-rate countries hike. The world does not give one answer to the same barrel.
6
Inside the US are voters on the buying side.
§04 described the US winning as a seller. But it also has buyers. SPR stocks of 285.4 million barrels are the lowest since 1982, falling 1.2 million a week; replenishment comes only from Venezuela (Chevron's USD 7 billion production-expansion/reserve-refill agreement, 8/29★). Diesel at USD 6.05 comes 8 weeks before the 11/3 midterms. March's refusal to consider petroleum-export restrictions turned into Bloomberg's September 11 account of what US fuel-export controls would mean★. Trump pressures refiners to lower prices and asks Ukraine to halt Russian diesel strikes. A possible inability to sell is America's weak point.
7
Russia is the other front in the diesel war.
Russia is the non-Middle-Eastern reason for the USD 106 diesel crack. Ukraine struck more than 24 refineries over 60 times; Russian refining is at a 24-year low. Russia banned diesel exports from July and extended the ban through September. On September 13, Trump called for Zelensky to stop destroying Russian diesel facilities. Zelensky said blackouts would receive the same response (both translated). Russia wins on barrels and loses on diesel. It also uses 3.09 million barrels/day of the southbound Suez route. Saudi Arabia's northern SUMED detour needs empty tankers there: only 1.1 vessels/day are available against a need for 3.9–5.1 (Kpler).
Seven destinations for the price of a barrel
★Not a composite. Different units sit side by side and do not share an axis. Compare bar lengths only within the same unit: percentages with percentages, multiples with multiples. Every bar states its unit and date; the seven figures are neither summed nor averaged
One barrel reached seven countries in seven shapes: gas bills, import prices, import volumes, output, foreign capital, freight rates and an index.
06
Seas and ships — two seas
Containers return to Suez; tankers do the opposite · Panama · Shipbuilding countries
The sea has split in two. Containers are returning to Suez. Drewry, September 10: selective returns to Suez services restore effective Asia–Europe capacity and pressure rates (translated). Shanghai–Rotterdam −2%, Shanghai–Genoa −3%. Weekly Suez transits are 290, +30% year on year, highest since early 2024. Tankers move the other way. Middle East→China VLCC rates are USD 800 thousand/day (45 thousand normally, a hypothetical rate); Hormuz war insurance is 40x prewar levels; Bab el-Mandeb has 3.3 tankers/day. Cape of Good Hope detours are 3x 2023 levels.
A third gate, unrelated to barrels, narrows the same week. Drought grips the Panama Canal. On September 15, daily transits fall from 34 to 32 vessels; on October 1, draft falls further to 14.48 meters. Slot auctions reached a record USD 5.3 million. Middle Eastern diversion demand adds to longer transit times.
Shipbuilding countries rise in a world short of ships. On September 14, Greece's Dynacom ordered 8 VLCCs for about USD 1 billion. Samsung Heavy Industries won 6 vessels for USD 1.2 billion, exceeding last year's total merchant-ship orders; SK oceanplant won 8 Aframaxes. With the KOSPI at −3.26%, transport/storage rose +1.48%. Last week HD Hyundai Heavy Industries gained +6.7%, HD Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering +3.4%, Samsung Heavy +3.3%. Here shipbuilding is not a stock pick. It is a measurement of barrels losing their route.
07
Yeouido — the eighth destination
Refining, petrochemicals, shipbuilding, memory — and households on September 30
The barrel's price reaches Korea along four routes; a fifth has a set date.
1
Refining earns money.
The USD 106 diesel crack belongs to Korean refiners, too. Healthy refining margins mean the industry is already profitable, rather than merely turning around (SK Innovation Q2 KRW 1.49 trillion; S-OIL KRW 959.2 billion, corrected in our 9/8 note). Naphtha tells the opposite story.
2
Petrochemicals remain under pressure.
Naphtha USD 96/barrel < Brent USD 108. Cheaper feedstock does not make crackers happy when its price reflects demand destruction.
3
Shipbuilding rises.
As in §06.
4
Memory is hit by the price of time.
On September 14, the KOSPI fell −3.26% (6,684); SK hynix −6.35% (KRW 1.697 million), Samsung Electronics −4.05% (KRW 249 thousand). Foreign net buying was −KRW 3.2875 trillion, the most in this phase; institutions −KRW 1.1715 trillion; retail investors +KRW 2.9722 trillion. Nasdaq had gained +0.96% the prior day. Brokers read the catalyst as Anthropic's Amodei calling on September 12 for a slower frontier, with agreement from OpenAI's Altman and Musk (KB Securities' Lim Jeong-eun: concerns over AI pacing and geopolitical tensions; Daishin Securities' Lee Kyoung-min: sentiment, not fundamentals—HBM is sold out; quotations translated).
Absent: reports of DRAM contract-price cuts, recommendation downgrades, new export controls (0 September US Commerce documents), or hyperscaler capex cuts—Oracle instead raised its plan. The price setter was the 2.60% real yield. Distant orders, such as NVIDIA's USD 279 billion commitments, mainly memory, lose value first as discount rates rise. The US sells promises; Korea receives them. The same statement became +0.96% in the US and −3.26% in Korea. Context: KOSPI +98% from 1 year earlier, −26% from the June 14 peak (9,052), with Samsung Electronics and SK hynix over half the market cap. September 14 was an aftershock.
5
Households receive it on September 30.
Fuel-tax cuts (gasoline −15%, diesel −25%, LPG −25%) expire September 30. An extension determines when the barrel's price reaches households. Korean 10-year government yields are 4.54%, 3-year 4.03%, the first 4% since November 2023; mortgages 7%; household debt KRW 2,019 trillion. Korea receives the prices of barrels and time together.
Alongside: the won is KRW 1,345 (9/14), still +11% stronger than June despite the oil shock (#18's direction remains; the pace has stopped). August FX reserves were USD 442.2 billion, up USD 14.3 billion, a record monthly increase.
The world fits inside one country. Korea buys LNG like Europe, absorbs import prices like Japan, cuts petrochemicals like China, builds ships like the Gulf, sees foreign selling like emerging economies, and earns refining profits like the US. It receives data centers' price of time through memory. Every route by which the barrel's price reaches the world overlaps in Yeouido.
Who drove the KOSPI's −3.26% on September 14?
Contribution breakdown of the 2026-09-14 KOSPI −3.26% (our kospi_contrib) · ★Contributions are an intraday snapshot and differ in decimals from the body's close (SK hynix −6.35%); both are stated. Flows use press reports (secondary) because the KRX session was unavailable
Trading flows — KRW trillion
Two stocks accounted for half the index move. §07 explains Korea's −3.26% on a day US Nasdaq was +0.96%: selling promises differs from receiving them.
08
Seven positions
From sellers to shipbuilders — route of arrival, response, weak point
Position
Country
How the barrel arrives
Response
Weak point
Sellers
US
Refining 97.8%; product exports
Hikes; SPR draws
Diesel $6.05; midterms; export controls★
Unable to sell
Gulf
Output lowest since 1990
Saudi restraint; Iraqi delivery outside Hormuz
Funding for US investment promises
Receiving through gas
Europe
TTF €83.66; storage 66%
ECB hikes; coal
Winter; gilts 6%; OATs
Receiving through currency
Japan
Import prices +30%
BOJ 1.25%; intervention; lower issuance
Hiking with CPI at 1.9%
Using less
China
Imports −30%; reserve draws
Hold; export deflation; gold
Refining at a low
Money leaving
EM
India foreign equity −INR 2.37tn
RBI hold; Brazil cut
Dollar + oil
Shipbuilders
Korea
Ship orders; tankers
—
Petrochemicals; memory duration; 9/30
09
Gains and losses — when barrels lose their route
If current directions persist — conditional calculations, not forecasts
Profits
Losses
US refining/product exports; non-Gulf producers (Brazil, Norway, Canada, Venezuela, Nigeria—Dangote refinery increased product exports 7x); tanker owners; shipbuilding; coal; Iraq (delivery outside Hormuz); dollar bondholders earning 2.6% real yields
Gulf producers (unable to sell); Europe (gas and rates); Asian petrochemicals (naphtha); aviation (US airfares +23% over 1 year); emerging importers (India); Japan (hiking with inflation below target); wage earners (US real wages −0.3%); indebted households (Korean mortgages 7%)
One point applies to both sides: higher oil does not lift every owner of physical assets. Last week's gains were shipbuilding and royalties—ownership without the operating costs. Gold, silver, mines, lithium, uranium and infrastructure managers fell. Assets whose barrel-related prices are set by politics—tariffs, permits and reserves—do not move with the barrel.
This table assumes current directions persist.
In the opposite case, with both gates open and corridors becoming genuine reopening, the left column moves to the right: tanker rates and cracks fall first, the Gulf recovers first. No individual stock is assessed and no asset purchase or sale is recommended.
Gauges — v8
Eight needles · Current values and trigger conditions — the widget above is live; this table records publication-time values
This report's gauges update with new observations after publication. No composite score: read the eight needles separately. #18's Four FX needles removed; they may return.
Current (data date): 424 / 285.4 (9/4) · Trigger: SPR weekly draws above 3 million; commercial stocks below 400 million
⑥
The price of time — weekly 10-year real-yield change vs BEI change
Current (data date): +17 / +1bp (9/4→11) · Trigger: weekly BEI ≥+10bp = the barrel starts becoming inflation
⑦
Gold — real-yield-model residual
Current (data date): +2.2pp (9/11) · Trigger: residual turns negative = real yields fully explain gold
⑧
Korea — fuel-tax expiry D-16; KOSPI foreign/retail flows
Current (data date): 9/30 · −KRW 3.29tn / +KRW 2.97tn (9/14) · Trigger: extension decision; retail net buying for 5 consecutive days (#17 savings absorbed the selling)
Alongside: our Hormuz report places the physical cell on September 13 in G4(gate closure plus loss of bypass, judged by preregistered rules). Control of both Bab el-Mandeb shores is not yet in the cell definition; it will enter the next judgment.
What to watch — with judgment conditions
Dates that test this report's needles — judgment rules written in advance
Scheduled 9/14 Salalah
GCC+Iran+Iraq foreign-ministers' meeting — postponed. On September 13, Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi posted that it was postponed to reach agreement. The ministry said the delay aimed at sustainable understandings supporting regional security and stability and conditions for constructive dialogue (translated). Bahrain withdrew over attacks by pro-Iranian forces; Saudi attendance became uncertain. No new date is set. Iran's foreign minister, 9/13: the corridor with Oman does not mean reopening (translated); seven conditions. Permanent-route negotiations: 30–60 days. Judgment: If the corridor lifts Hormuz traffic above 20 vessels/day, a new needle is needed, rather than ①.
9/16 (Wed) EIA weekly
First week reflecting 9/8 Houthi refinery strikes, the two gates on 9/10–11, and SPR.
9/17 (Thu) 03:00 FOMC
This report is published beforehand. Markets price a hike at 79–90%. #20 will revisit the result and the dots' long-run point (June 3.1%).
10/1: further Panama draft reduction; 10/4: OPEC+ JMMC; early November: expected end of Qatar force majeure; 11/3: US midterms.
#20
What #20 will revisit④ Naphtha crack sign; ⑥ weekly BEI change; ⑧ fuel taxes; FOMC.
The barrel rose in price at Perim. In Doha it became gas, in Tokyo yen, in Shanghai less consumption, in Mumbai outgoing dollars, in New York the price of time, and in Yeouido memory's value. In 1973 it became inflation; in 2026 it became interest rates. The difference came from a world where demand breaks first, a US that became a seller, and data centers taking over the price of time from barrels.
