The gust lasted all day and still did not stop.
Even as the sun sets, we watch from the same place.
02
Retail Investors Absorbed KRW 4.3tn
Final close · Unit: KRW 100 million · Foreign selling concentrated in KOSPI; KOSDAQ turned to net buying
Buyers — retail investors
+43,179
From +KRW 2.57tn in the morning, another KRW 1.75tn bought in the afternoon — absorbing sales throughout the day
Sellers — foreign investors
-49,841
From −KRW 2.3tn in the morning, selling doubled in the afternoon
Net buying by investor type at the close
Institutions bought just +KRW 638.6bn; on KOSDAQ, foreign investors turned net buyers
View table
| Market | Retail investors | Foreign investors | Institutions |
| KOSPI | +43,179 | -49,841 | +6,386 |
| KOSDAQ | +499 | +869 | -1,339 |
Unit: KRW 100 million · 2026-07-28 close · Source: Financial News closing roundup · Cross-checked against pipeline turnover.json
Why we cannot read this as "institutions absorbed the selling"
Of institutions' +KRW 638.6bn net buying, pension funds accounted for only KRW 116.5bn. The rest is closer to the balance left after financial investment firms, investment trusts, and others offset each other. The institutional net total alone looks like directional buying, but broken down by investor type, neither benchmark tracking nor bargain buying has yet reached scale. On KOSDAQ, institutions net-sold −KRW 133.9bn, including −KRW 107.8bn from investment trusts.
03
How Much Debt Has Been Cleared?
Korea Financial Investment Association (KOFIA) source data for 7/27 · KOSPI and KOSDAQ viewed separately
KOSDAQ margin loans
6.906tn
-37.51%
4/29 peak: KRW 11.0506tn → 7/27: KRW 6.9056tn
KOSPI margin loans
25.84tn
-13.17%
6/24 peak: KRW 29.7543tn → 7/27: KRW 25.8355tn
Leverage intensity
0.978
+8.4% in a day
7/27 0.903 → 7/28 0.978 · Debt fell, yet intensity rose
Unsettled brokerage receivables
945.5bn
−56% from KRW 2.15tn on 3/5
Very short-term leverage is already below KRW 1tn
Decline from the peak — KOSPI deleveraging has begun too
KOSDAQ has been deleveraging for over 3 quarters; KOSPI began in late June
Both markets built up together and are now cutting back together. Total margin loans grew from KRW 33.33tn in March to their 6/24 level of 38.63tn, an increase of KRW 5.3tn, then fell KRW 5.9tn to KRW 32.74tn on 7/27 (−15.25%). The difference is sequence and depth: KOSDAQ began earlier (4/29 peak) and went deeper (−37.5%); KOSPI began later (6/24 peak) and has gone less far (−13.2%).
The difference in declines is 24%p, leaving much more room for KOSPI to deleverage.
Margin loans per 100 index points — debt's weight relative to market size
Margin loans divided by the index level (green, left axis). Higher means heavier debt. Intensity moves through both the numerator (debt) and denominator (index), so we overlay KOSDAQ index (gray, right axis) is overlaid. If the index collapses, intensity soars even with debt unchanged.
★Click a green-bordered window (pandemic 2020-03 · now) to open an expanded daily chart.
Leverage intensity — Left axis
KOSDAQ index — Right axis
Historical index-low dates
2021–25 margin-investing regime
Now: 0.978 — KRW 0.978tn of margin loans per 100 index points. It has fallen to the bottom of the margin-investing regime range (0.96–1.19), lighter than the last three lows (1.06–1.17), but is still heavier than the pandemic low's level (0.948) by 3%.
Note: Why low markers sit on peaks: indices can fall sharply in a day, while margin liquidation lags by several days, so intensity peaks on the day the index bottoms. In 2020, it reached 0.948 on 3/19, then fell to 0.598 after 8 trading days (−36.9%). The same structure applies today: the one-day rise from 0.903 on 7/27 to 0.978 happened because the index collapsed 7.72%, not because debt rose.
Alongside past lows
Each low shows intensity on the day the index bottomed — the heaviest moment, just after the index fell sharply and before margin liquidation
View table
| Low | Index | Margin loans | Intensity |
| 2016-12-05 rangebound market | 575 | 3.75tn | 0.653 |
| 2019-08-06 trade dispute | 552 | 4.84tn | 0.878 |
| 2020-03-19 pandemic | 428 | 4.06tn | 0.948 |
| 2026-07-28 now | 706 | 6.91tn | 0.978 |
| 2024-12-09 martial law | 627 | 6.62tn | 1.055 |
| 2025-04-09 tariff shock | 643 | 7.00tn | 1.088 |
| 2022-10-13 tightening bear | 652 | 7.62tn | 1.170 |
So what does 0.978 mean now?
This number reads "the index has just collapsed," not "debt is heavy". Historically, intensity also peaked on the index-low day, then fell sharply as margin liquidation followed several days later (in 2020, 0.95 on 3/19 → 0.60 after 12 days). Not a single line of forced liquidation from today's −7.72% is reflected yet. 7/27 was actually a rebound day, when KOSPI margin loans grew KRW 85.5bn. The real figures arrive 7/30~31.
05
This Is Not Risk-Off
Broader indices were fine while semiconductors alone collapsed. The shock was distributed in proportion to concentration.
Same news, different declines (7/28 Asia · US 7/27 close)
Hong Kong actually rose, as did Europe and the Dow — money was not leaving risk assets
Korea's excess decline
-6.0%p
20-day cumulative −8.4pp
Residual versus an Asian semiconductor basket
Korea's beta (β)
1.26~1.41
60d · 120d
The same news hits at 1.3–1.4x intensity
Philadelphia Semiconductor Index
-3.5%
−20%+ from the June high
The index is near a record, but the sector alone is in a bear market
Dollar index
101.49
USD/KRW 1,462.5
Not a strong dollar — a won-specific problem
The paradox — the other conditions were favorable
Oil −8.7%, US 10-year Treasury yield 4.639% (−4bp), dollar index 101.5. Falling oil + falling yields + a weak dollar is normally favorable for emerging markets. Korea missed all those benefits because of semiconductors. Korea's problem is portfolio concentration, not global macro. At its July 8 meeting, the government said greater semiconductor weight was increasing volatility. 3 weeks later, events confirmed it.
06
Oil Bought Easing Tensions. The Strait Is Still Closed.
The largest gap we confirmed today
Market-priced probabilities vs. physical conditions
Scenario probabilities inferred from the current price (left), and our assessment (right)
Expected fair value: $104.4 vs. current price: $81.4 — gap: $23. The market assigns 0% to S2 (wider blockage), 50% to S3 (easing).
Yet this is the physical situation
At a July 27 briefing, Iran's foreign-ministry spokesperson said "the Strait of Hormuz remains closed" (translated). That has not changed since the July 11 declaration of an indefinite blockade. At the same briefing: "we are not currently in any negotiations with the United States" (translated). On the same day, President Trump said Iran wanted to meet and they were meeting. The two sides' statements directly contradict each other. What is actually underway is bilateral Iran–Oman talks, which Iran explicitly said were unrelated to the US.
On top of that, a tanker exploded near Hormuz on July 26. Iran's explanation: it contacted a naval mine after leaving the designated route — mines are still there.
Prices have bought a half-probability of easing on just one headline: a halt to US air strikes. If oil rebounds, Korea faces another headwind.
07
The Government Tightened Rather Than Propped Up
The first response to −10.84% was regulation, not stimulus
"If demand for single-stock leveraged products does not cool sufficiently, we will consider and prepare further measures, including higher investment requirements and individual investment limits." (translated) — FSC Chairman Lee Eog-weon, July 28, Korea Financial Investment Association (KOFIA)
An individual limit of around 20% of total investments was discussed. From July 31, the minimum deposit rises to at least KRW 30 million in cash — confirmed implementation, not a proposal. There was no mention of a market stabilization fund or short selling..
The same stance as July 8
The only measures from the financial-market review chaired by the deputy prime minister 3 weeks ago were 24-hour FX trading, a won-internationalization roadmap, and adjustments to government-bond issuance. There were 0 stock-market stimulus measures. The diagnosis was "profit-taking and rebalancing sales." Today's −10.84% did not change that stance. The government does not see this decline as something to rescue.
The constraints are clear too: on 7/16, the BOK raised rates to 2.75% (the first change of direction in 3 years and 6 months), clashing directly with liquidity measures. With USD/KRW high at 1,462.5, easing liquidity would pressure the exchange rate. The June 3 local elections are over, and the next nationwide election is in 2028, putting political urgency at its lowest.
And on July 31, two shocks coincide
Forced liquidation is already surging — from KRW 56.5bn in January to KRW 393.5bn in June (+596%), across 21,615 accounts (+47% on the previous month). The average per account rose from KRW 9.32 million to KRW 18.2 million. For those aged 70 and above, KRW 1.8bn rose to KRW 16.3bn (+791%), the No. 1 growth rate. But all these figures run only through June. The forced liquidations from today's −10.84% appear on July 30–31.
Then The minimum-deposit increase takes effect on that same July 31.
Forced sales and a barrier to new entry arrive on the same day — for the very retail investors who absorbed KRW 4.3tn today.
08
Three Days Starting Tomorrow: All Tests
Prices moved today. Physical data arrive this week.
7/29 (Wed)
09:00
SK hynix Q2 earnings — today's biggest hurdle
Consensus estimates from 14 brokerages: revenue KRW 84.06tn · operating profit KRW 64.09tn, operating margin 75~77% (previous quarter: 72%). Last year's full-year operating profit was KRW 47.2tn. This single quarter would exceed it by KRW 17tn, with first-half profit expected to exceed KRW 100tn.
Watch three comments, not the headline numbers — ①capex guidance (half the rationale for KOSDAQ equipment stocks' −13% fall rests here); ②commodity DRAM prices (whether CXMT competition is absorbed); ③70% revenue share from AI data centers (KB forecast) — this third point is exactly the same vulnerability as tonight's circular-financing concern in New York. The more concentrated the customers, the more their funding structure becomes SK hynix's risk. The better the numbers, the bigger the question: whose money is generating these profits?
7/30 (Thu)
03:00
FOMC outcome Hike probability: 35.8%; ING expects a hold. With oil just down −12%, a hold is the baseline, but a hawkish signal under Chair Warsh would add another interest-rate axis to today's decline.
7/30 (Thu)
Samsung Electronics Q2 earnings A second answer to the same question. Since 6/10, DDR5 spot prices have risen +14% without interruption. The key is how much commodity DRAM price commentary can absorb CXMT concerns.
7/30–31
Margin loans and deposits update — the real test of this episode
Today's −10.84%/−7.72% will appear in the first data. How much will KOSDAQ's KRW 6.906tn and KOSPI's KRW 25.84tn shrink? This also shows how far leverage intensity of 0.978 actually falls.
7/31 (Fri)
Minimum cash deposit raised to KRW 30 million Takes effect
The same day as forced liquidations. Two shocks hit retail flows at once.
7/30–31
BOJ
USD/JPY 163.72, near the intervention zone (164–165). The yen's direction affects the won and Asian flows broadly.
7/29–8/1
Presidential trip — Chile and Argentina (lithium triangle) Departed 7/24, returning 8/3. Brazil produced 7 MOUs, but critical minerals remained at "agreement on the need," with no amounts, volumes, or timelines. The test in Chile and Argentina is whether numbers are attached. If so, KOSDAQ battery materials become the only alternative narrative.
Then Around the 8/3 return is a window for "trip outcomes + stock-market measures" to appear together.
Boboo's Rules for Watching
Put today's four together, and one sentence emerges: Oil, the semiconductor narrative, the sustainability of SK hynix's profits, and retail investors' buying power are all in the same state: prices have moved; physical conditions have not yet delivered a verdict. Those verdicts all arrive this week.
Gusts change direction, not terrain. In three days, we will know what was terrain.